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Fracking Preemption Litigation
James K. Pickle*
Abstract
Fracking is not a new technology, but it only recently
came to the forefront of energy industry news. Fracking’s recent
fame has been both positive and negative. Fracking proponents
have lauded the economic and environmental benefits of the
process. They cite the process’ ability to extract formerly
inaccessible oil and natural gas, which reduces the U.S.’s demand
for foreign oil and natural gas and reduces the use of coal. In
contrast, fracking opponents state fracking damages the
environment by diluting drinking water with harmful chemicals,
generating emissions, and creating general nuisances for
communities. They believe fracking’s harmful impacts clearly
outweigh any benefits that arise from the process. Instead of
having a uniform regulatory scheme for this controversial topic,
the federal government, state governments, and municipal
governments have created a mishmash of regulations, and much
consternation and litigation have arisen from conflicts between
state and municipal laws. This Note will explore the litigation
currently in state courts, specifically West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Colorado, which will decide
the future of fracking. This Note will also explain how the
arguments in each case are essentially the same. After reviewing
the pertinent litigation surrounding this issue, this Note proposes
that a more centralized, comprehensive federal regime is the best
regulatory option for fracking.
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I. Introduction
The oil and natural gas industry’s recent use of hydraulic
fracturing, commonly known as “fracking,”1 has generated both

1.
See Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism: Support for an
Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L.
& POL’Y 913, 919–21 (2011) (describing the process of fracking).
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vast benefits and numerous headaches for the United States.2
Fracking is not a new technology, but it only recently came to the
forefront of energy industry news.3 Fracking’s recent fame has
been both positive and negative.4 For example, proponents of
fracking have lauded the economic and environmental benefits of
the process.5 They cite its ability to extract formerly inaccessible
oil and natural gas that could reduce the United States’ demand
for foreign oil and natural gas and reduce its use of coal. 6
Opponents have alleged that fracking damages the environment
by diluting drinking water with harmful chemicals, generating
emissions, and creating nuisances for communities.7 They believe
that fracking’s possible harmful impacts outweigh any of the
benefits that arise from the process. 8 Instead of a uniform
regulatory scheme governing this controversial topic, the federal
government, state governments, and municipal governments

2.
See id. at 23–29 (explaining the impact fracking has had on the
United States).
3.
See id. at 918–19 (describing the recent media attention given
to fracking).
4.
See Jody Freeman & David Spence, Should the Federal
Government Regulate Fracking?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323495104578314302738
867078?mg=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887323
495104578314302738867078.html (outlining both the negative and positive
effects of fracking) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
5.
See id. (noting that “[f]racking has the potential to help the
U.S. achieve energy independence, boost the economy and reduce greenhousegas pollution.”).
6.
See id. (stating that “[f]racking—short for hydraulic
fracturing—involves injecting fluids into the ground to access hard-to-reach
reserves of oil and natural gas, including shale gas, which the U.S. has in vast
abundance but hasn’t been able to reach easily up to now.”).
7.
See id. (specifying that fracking “produces significant amounts
of air pollution and methane, a potent greenhouse gas. It also generates
wastewater, often containing toxic chemicals. At scale, fracking requires vast
amounts of water, which can reduce regional supplies. And industrializing the
countryside not only disturbs locals, it can harm habitat and wildlife.”).
8.
See Powers, supra note 1, at 924–25 (listing the documented
risks of fracking, including groundwater pollution, toxic air emissions, chemical
spills, roadway deterioration, and “destruction of ecologically sensitive habitat
and the landscape”).
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have created a mishmash of regulations that have led to litigation
over conflicts between state and municipal laws.9
Generally, individual states have widely endorsed
fracking, and those states want to retain regulatory control of the
industry.10 State legislatures feel that they are best suited to
regulate fracking because they, unlike municipal governments,
are intimately familiar with their respective state’s geology,
economic development priorities, and legal regimes associated
with property and leases.11 On the other hand, some
municipalities disfavor fracking and have now begun banning
it.12 Most municipalities are granted authority to protect their
citizens from nuisances and to regulate the use of land through
the enactment of zoning laws by way of their state constitutions,
and municipalities analogize fracking to the nuisances from
which they are allowed to protect their citizens.13
Conflicts between state and local regulations have
generated a considerable amount of litigation.14 State courts in
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Colorado have
been called upon to decide whether their state statutes regulating
fracking preempt local legislative bans on the process. 15 While the
9.
See Jason Schumacher & Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal
Landscape of “Fracking”: The Oil and Gas Industry’s Game-Changing Technique
is its Biggest Hurdle, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 260–261 (2013) (describing
fracking’s existing regulatory regime).
10.
See id. at 260–61 (stating that “[b]ecause of the many variables
in local geology, economics, and so forth, there is a general consensus that
regulation is best left to the states, where hydraulic fracturing is already a
highly regulated activity.”).
11.
See id. at 260 (describing the critical components of fracking
that are commonly regulated by states).
12.
See Timothy O’Connor & Joseph De Avila, Fracking Cases to
Top,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
30,
2013)
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324009304579043250553
113252?mg=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887324
009304579043250553113252.html (noting that “some cities, counties, and
municipalities have begun to enact bans on hydraulic fracturing”) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
13.
See id. (specifying the reasons for supporting municipal
regulatory power).
14.
See id. (identifying conflicts between New York state and
municipal governments).
15.
See e.g., Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No.
13CV63, 2014 WL 3690665, at *14 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 24, 2014) (“Article XVI of
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laws in each state and municipality differ, the arguments in each
case are essentially the same.16 For proponents of state
regulation, the argument boils down to state law creating a
comprehensive regulatory system or granting the state sole
regulatory authority.17 Thus, any municipal law restricting or
the Longmont Municipal Charter, which bans hydraulic fracturing and the
storage and disposal of hydraulic fracturing waste in the City of Longmont, is
invalid as preempted by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act.”); Norse
Energy Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(stating that the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law “does not preempt, either
expressly or impliedly, a municipality's power to enact a local zoning ordinance
banning all activities related to the exploration for, and the production or
storage of, natural gas and petroleum within its borders.”); State ex rel.
Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (holding
that certain drilling ordinances were in direct conflict with and preempted by a
state law); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013)
(finding that a statute restricting municipalities right to restrict fracking
unconstitutional under the Environmental Rights Amendment); Ne. Natural
Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *9 (W.
Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (concluding that the State’s interest in oil and gas
development and production justifies the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection exclusively controlling this area of the law.).
16.
See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *2
(describing how “owners of oil and gas interests [have] challenged regulations
enacted by La Plata County, a statutory entity. The regulations stated purpose
was to promote the health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity or
general welfare of the present and future residents of La Plata County.”); see
also State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 88 (noting that “the question to be
answered is whether the City of Munroe Falls can enforce its ordinances
governing oil and gas drilling and related zoning and rights-of-way issues
despite the state’s comprehensive statutory scheme for drilling set forth in R.C.
Chapter 1509.”).
17.
See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *2 (stating
that “[t]he Bowen/Edwards plaintiffs claimed the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Act conferred exclusive authority on the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission to regulate oil and gas activity throughout the state,
thereby preempting the county regulations.”); see also Norse Energy, 964
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (noting that “t]he supersession clause in the OGSML provides
that ‘[t]he provisions of [ECL article 23] shall supersede all local laws or
ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining
industries’”); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (describing that the
statute at issue states “this chapter and rules adopted under it constitute a
comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling, well
stimulation, completing, and operating of oil and gas wells within this state,
including site construction and restoration, permitting related to those
activities, and the disposal of wastes from those wells.”); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d
at 913 (stating that the dispositive issue is the controlling source of legal
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banning fracking would be in conflict with state law and
preempted.18 For proponents of municipal regulation, the basic
argument is that state constitutions grant municipalities power
to adopt ordinances over local issues, and fracking is an issue of
local concern because of its potential negative effects on local
communities.19 As a result, municipal ordinances restricting or
banning fracking are not preempted and should remain valid. 20
Although state and municipal legislatures should weigh
fracking’s positive and negative consequences when enacting
fracking laws, courts are not required to consider those policy
concerns.21 The courts involved in this preemption litigation
should focus on the constitutional preemption issues in each case,
and the courts should conclude that each state’s fracking
regulation preempts the municipal fracking bans.22 In addition,
after reviewing the complexity of the existing fracking regulatory
regime, it is evident that a comprehensive federal regulatory

authority); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5–6 (outlining the prostate regulation argument).
18.
See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9
(concluding that the state agency regulates hydraulic fracturing); see also State
ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (holding that “[t]he city, however, is
permitted to enforce pertinent right-of-way ordinances in the face of the drilling
activities, provided these ordinances are not enforced in a discriminatory
manner against oil and gas well drilling.”); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d, at 913
(finding that certain “provisions of Act 13 violate the Commonwealth’s duties as
trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Environmental
Rights Amendment”); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376 (holding that the
state “regulations do not provide any exception or latitude to permit the City of
Morgantown to impose a complete ban on fracking or to regulate oil and gas
development and production.”).
19.
See Shaun A. Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing:
Trends in State Preemption, HARVARD LAW BLOG (July 2012),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2013/03/Municipali
ties-and-Hydraulic-Fracturing-Trends-in-State-Preemption.pdf (explaining the
pro-municipal regulation argument) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
20.
See id. (stating the pro-municipal regulation conclusion).
21.
See id. (describing the legal conflicts at issue in preemption
litigation).
22.
See Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *2 (detailing
pro-state regulation arguments).
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regime involving minimal state regulation and no municipal
regulation is much needed in the future.23
This Note will explore the complexity of the existing
fracking regulatory regime, as well as the preemption litigation
that has arisen between states and municipalities because of the
convoluted regulatory system.24 Part II of this Note provides
background information on how fracking works, the costs and
benefits of fracking, and the structure of the existing regulatory
regime.25 Part III analyzes the arguments in the completed and
current cases dealing with preemption litigation arising from
disputes between state fracking laws and municipal fracking
bans.26 Part III ends with explanations of how the courts involved
in current preemption litigation should rule in each case. This
Note concludes with a discussion on the complexity and costliness
of fracking’s existing regulatory system and provides potential
alternative regulatory regimes that would minimize costs and
completely eliminate preemption litigation.

II. Background
A. What It Is and How It Works
Hydraulic-fracturing, also known as “fracking,” is a gas
drilling and extraction technique involving “the injection of fluid
into a well to cause subsurface formations to fracture and release
natural gas.”27 Fracking is not a recently developed process. 28 The
process originated in the U.S. in the 1940s and has been
continuously used for the last seven decades.29 It only recently
23.
See Freeman, supra note 4 (listing arguments in support of
federal regulation).
24.
See Colorado Oil and Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *1
(listing current litigation concerning conflicting regulatory regimes).
25.
See Powers, supra note 1, at 919–21 (describing the process of
fracking).
26.
See supra note 15 (listing current litigation concerning
conflicting regulatory regimes).
27.
See Powers, supra note 1, at 919 (detailing the mechanics of
the fracking process).
28.
See id. (stating that fracking was “[f]irst developed in the
1940s”).
29.
See id. (“Hydraulic fracturing has been used throughout the
country for about sixty years and in New York State since the 1950s.”).
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became well known because of the discovery of the Marcellus
Shale natural gas formation.30
To implement the fracking process, a well is drilled into
bedrock creating what industry experts call a “wellbore,” after
which acid is injected in the wellbore to eliminate any bacteria in
the wellbore.31 A metal and concrete casing is then fitted into the
wellbore and a mix of chemicals, commonly called “fracturing
fluids,” is shot through the wellbore at high pressure to open or
enlarge fractures in the geological formation.32 This process
“allow[s] oil or natural gas to move more freely from the rock
pores to production wells that bring the oil or gas to the
surface.”33
The fracking fluid injected into the geological formations is
typically composed of many different chemicals, but water and
sand are the primary components.34 Typically, water and sand
compose 99.5% of the fluid, and chemical additives compose the
remaining 0.5%.35 Those additives include “chemical agents with
anti-corrosive and anti-bacterial functions, many of which are
highly toxic.”36
After cracking the target geological formation, the
fracturing fluids, or “flowback,” returns to the surface where it

30.
See id. (describing that “[t]he first horizontal well in the East
was drilled in Pennsylvania in 2003 to reach the gas-rich Marcellus shale
formation, which underlies much of the Appalachian region.”).
31.
See id. at 920 (outlining the process of drilling a well, fitting
the wellbore with steel and concrete casing, and pumping chemicals into the
wellbore).
32.
See Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (May 9, 2012), [hereinafter EPA
Fracking
Background],
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydr
owhat.cfm (explaining the second step in the fracking process) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
33.
Id.
34.
See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING:
UNLOCKING AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS RESOURCES 7 (July 2014), available at

http://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-and-natural-gas/hydraulic-fracturingprimer/hydraulic-fracturing-primer-2014-highres.pdf (“[f]racturing fluid is made
up from 90% water, 9% sand and .5% chemicals) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
35.
See id. (listing the chemical composition of fracturing fluids).
36.
See Powers, supra note 1, at 920.
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can be stored.37 The flowback returns to the surface because the
internal pressure of the formation forces the flowback up through
the wellbore.38 Not all of the flowback rises back to the surface
causing concerns over the potential “contaminat[ion] of
groundwater sources for waterways and drinking supplies.” 39

B. Consequences
1. Negative
There are several alleged harms associated with
fracking.40 The harms “range from quality of life issues, such as
persistent noise and vibrations from drilling and underground
injection, to health impacts from exposure to air and water
pollutants, to property value destruction, to social disruption.”41
Specifically alleged quality of life issues include: erosion
from construction and pipeline siting; noise and light pollution;
increased truck traffic and roadway deterioration; and
destruction of ecological habitats and the landscapes. 42 Specific
alleged health impact issues include: gas or fracking fluid
contaminating groundwater; toxic air emissions from gas leaks;
chemical spills; chemical fires and gas explosions; and improper
disposal of toxic chemicals.43
Opponents primarily cite issues with water pollution
because “[w]astewater treatment facilities are not always
equipped to handle drilling waste.”44 Water pollution could arise
from fracking fluid seeping through the targeted formations into
water sources or runoff of flowback into surface or groundwater
resources.45 Flowback can contaminate groundwater immediately
37.
See EPA Fracking Background, supra note 32 (noting the
effects of geological pressures on the fracking process).
38.
See Powers, supra note 1, at 920 (explaining the incidental
results of fracking).
39.
Id.
40.
See Powers, supra note 1, at 924 (describing fracking’s
potentially widespread negative consequences).
41.
Id.
42.
See id. (listing specific negative effects).
43.
See id. at 924–25 (outlining negative health effects).
44.
Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 247.
45.
See id. at 244 (explaining potential negative effects on water
supplies).
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after expulsion from the wellbore or after leakage from
containment pits dug in the ground.46
Fracking proponents answer the seeping fracking fluid
argument by citing studies that indicate, “migration of
contaminants through up to a mile of rock into the water table is
unlikely, though theoretically possible.”47 Fracking proponents
respond to the flowback contamination threat by citing that
regulators closely scrutinize management and disposal of
fracking fluid. 48
The other most cited alleged negative consequences
concerns emissions, land use, and seismic activity.49 Toxic air
emissions primarily “stem from methane leaks originating from
wells, and emissions from the diesel or natural gas-powered
equipment such as compressors, drilling rigs, pumps, and so forth
that are used in the process of constructing the well and
extracting the gas.”50
Land use issues primarily arise when fracking rigs are
located near residential areas, and these troublesome situations
have become prevalent due to the fracking of the Marcellus Shale
formation.51 Recent seismic activity in areas where earthquakes
usually do not occur has been linked to fracking because rigs are
located near the seismic activity, but a definitive link has not yet
been confirmed.52

2. Positive
Natural gas production from fracking can be “enormously
profitable and bring . . . hard-to-resist economic benefits
to . . . state[s].”53 Landowners with property rich in gas or oil
46.
See id. at 246 (listing additional potential negative
consequences on water supplies).
47.
See id. at 245–46 (describing counterarguments to the water
dilution effect).
48.
See id. at 246 (presenting regulations in place to prevent water
dilution).
49.
See id. at 251–53 (noting more, less well known, negative
consequences).
50.
Id. at 251.
51.
See id. at 252 (describing potential land use issues).
52.
See id. at 252–53 (identifying the possibility of induced seismic
activity).
53.
Powers, supra note 1, at 927.

FRACKING PREEMPTING LITIGATION

305

typically lease their land to drillers and receive royalties and
signing bonuses in return. 54 Signing bonuses can be thousands of
dollars, and royalties from one acre of leased land for one year
can be six figures.55
Landowners are not the only citizens of states to benefit
from fracking.56 Fracking can also generate job opportunities
because the method is composed of several other processes. 57
According to estimates, “the natural gas industry is expected to
create over 75,000 new jobs by 2020, provide $600 million in state
revenue, as well as $270 million in local tax revenue” for
Pennsylvania under the existing regulatory scheme.58 The
Marcellus Shale formation under Pennsylvania is “estimated to
be worth at least $500 billion.” 59
IHS Global Insight, a data mining company focusing on
the energy sector, determined that the development of shale gas
via fracking could lead to lower household energy bills for
consumers, thus creating additional disposable income. 60
Specifically, IHS Global Insight estimated that the “development
of shale gas resources added $1,200 of disposable household
income in 2012, and that amount could increase to more than
$3,500 by 2025.”61
Natural gas also may be a viable alternative to the United
States’ reliance on coal and oil and may significantly reduce the
nation’s greenhouse gas emissions.62 The United States has

54.
See id. at 927 (explaining positive effects for landowners).
55.
See id. (outlining exactly how much landowners can expect to
receive from fracking leases).
56.
See id. (describing other positive effects).
57.
See id. (noting job growth as a positive result from fracking).
58.
Kristen Allen, Comment, The Big Fracking Deal: Marcellus
Shale—Pennsylvania’s Untapped Re$ource, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 52 (2012).
59.
Id.
60.
See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SHALE ANSWERS, at slide
5
(2013),
available
at
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Hydraulic_Fracturing/Shale-AnswersBrochure.pdf, (listing positive effects for everyday energy consumers) (on file
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
61.
Id.
62.
See Joshua P. Dennis, Comment, The Emergence of Natural
Gas and the Need for Cooperative Federalism to Address a Big “Fracking”
Problem, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 253, 255 (2012) (illustrating how
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significant natural gas reserves. 63 The Energy Information
Administration in 2011 “estimated that the United States
possesses approximately 2,552 TCF of potential natural gas
resources, enough to supply the United States for approximately
110 years.”64 TCF is an abbreviation for trillion cubic feet, and it
is a common volume measurement of natural gas.65 Of that 2,552
TCF, 862 TCF is technically recoverable shale gas.66 The 862 TCF
makes the United States’ reserves the second largest in the
world.67

C. Effect on the United States’ Energy Industry
Fracking “has transformed America’s prospects as a
hydrocarbons producer.”68 Fracking has increased both gas and
oil output at least thirty percent since the mid 2000s.69 Fracking
has also helped push the United States’ expected oil and gas
production combined beyond that of any country in the world. 70
“Jobs in energy have nearly doubled in the United States since
2005, . . . [and] North Dakota, which sits on the huge Bakken oil
and gas field, now boasts an unemployment rate of just three

natural gas could be used as a viable alternative energy source to help reduce
greenhouse gas emissions).
63.
See id. at 256 (describing the United States’ natural gas
resources).
64.
Id.
65.
See Trillion Cubic Feet – TCF, INVESTOPEDIA, (last visited Dec.
29, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trillion-cubic-feet.asp (noting the
volume measurements for natural gas) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
66.
See Dennis, supra note 62, at 256 (describing how much of the
United States’ natural gas is recoverable).
67.
See id. (noting the United States’ rank compared to other
nations’ amount of recoverable natural gas).
68.
From Sunset to New Dawn, THE ECONOMIST, (Nov. 16, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21589870-capitalists-not-just-greensare-now-questioning-how-significant-benefits-shale-gas-and (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
69.
See id. (explaining the growth in extracted natural resources
because of fracking).
70.
See id. (outlining the global effect fracking has had on the
current natural gas and oil production hierarchy).
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percent, the lowest among the states.”71 Natural gas prices
“ha[ve] [also] fallen by two-thirds.”72
Various industry reports project that, within six to ten
years, shale gas and oil will add between $380 billion and $690
billion to the United States’ annual gross domestic product.73 The
reports state that the drilling process itself will not be the only
factor leading to this GDP growth.74 “[A]ll the other activities
needed to produce and distribute the fuels . . . [are] being
transformed too.”75 Gas-fired power stations are replacing coalfired stations in the electricity production sector, and this effect
even reduced greenhouse-gas emissions from power generation in
the United States between 2010 and 2012.76 Overall, “[t]he
spending-power of . . . new workers [from incidental business
growth], and the cut in businesses’ and households’ energy bills,
should provide a broad boost to the economy.”77
With that said, cheap natural gas has pressed energy
companies to move away from other forms of energy, like nuclear
power.78 An executive at Exelon Corporation, a leading U.S.
power generator, has said the recent natural gas trends have “not
only made new nuclear plants unfeasible . . . but [have]
undermined Exelon’s plans to upgrade its existing fleet.”79 In May
of 2013, Duke Energy, another U.S. power generator, told the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), the federal agency that
approves the construction of new nuclear power plants, 80 that it
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
See id. (noting potential future growth due to fracking).
See id. (describing incidental growth).
Id.
See id. (listing further environmental benefits).
Id.
See Jeff McMahon, How Fracking Killed Nuclear Power,
FORBES
(June
6,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2013/06/16/fracking-not-wind-killedexelons-nuclear-upgrades/ (explaining how fracking has altered the whole
energy sector) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
79.
Id.
80.
See generally Organization & Functions, UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/organization.html (providing functional descriptions for committees and
offices of the NRC) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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would not be building two of the six originally planned reactors.81
Yet another American power company, Dominion Resources, shut
down one of its nuclear plants in May of 2013 “based purely on
economics,” such as the falling price of natural gas.82
But as the United States pushes for alternative and
renewable energy options, fracking appears to be an
environmental middle ground because natural gas power plants
“produce less air pollution than coal-burning plants.”83

D. Current Regulatory Scheme
1. Regulatory Overview
Fracking is highly regulated, but one governmental body
does not regulate the entire industry.84 The fracking industry is
regulated through a three-prong regime.85 The industry is
governed on the federal level by administrative agencies
including the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”), and the Department of Energy (“DOE”).86 Additionally,
state agencies—such as the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (“PaDEP”) and the West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”)—and local
governments regulate the fracking industry.87 The three-part
regulatory system exists because fracking has “many
81.
See Fracked Off, THE ECONOMIST (May 30, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21578690-thanks-cheap-naturalgas-americas-nuclear-renaissance-hold-fracked
(noting
specific
energy
companies changing strategies because of fracking) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
82.
Id.
83.
NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS IN
AMERICA’S
ENERGY
MIX,
(June
2012),
available
at
http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/energymixII.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
84.
See Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 257–58
(describing the complex regulatory scheme generally).
85.
See id. (outlining the existing regulatory scheme).
86.
See id. (elaborating on the federal part of the regulatory
scheme).
87.
See id. at 284–94 (listing state agencies involved in fracking
regulation).
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variables . . . [including] local geology . . . [but also national]
economics.”88 As federal, state, and municipal fracking
regulations are spliced together, this regulatory regime is
complex, convoluted, and costly.89 Consequently, some legal
authors propose increasing federal regulation and centralizing all
regulatory power on the federal level.90

2. Federal Regulation
Although “there is no comprehensive regulatory scheme at
the federal level,” the federal government does regulate key
aspects of fracking.91 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
commonly known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), regulates
surface water discharges and storm water runoff.92 The Safe
Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) “regulates the disposal of fluid
waste deep underground.” 93 The EPA enacted its first
comprehensive regulation of fracking emissions in 2012 using
their authority from the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).94 The
Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) requires drillers to report the use and
release of certain hazardous chemicals into the environment.95
Furthermore, “the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
requires permits and environmental impact assessments to be
conducted prior to drilling.”96

88.
Id. at 260.
89.
See Jason T. Gerken, Comment, What the Frack Shale We Do?
A Proposed Environmental Regulatory Scheme for Hydraulic Fracturing, 41 CAP.
U. L. REV. 81, 101–22 (2013) (explaining the many levels of regulation and how
they relate).
90.
See id. at 128 (describing a potential regulatory scheme
focused on the federal government).
91.
Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 260.
92.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (2012).
93.
Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 261 (citing the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2012)).
94.
The Clean Air Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
95.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
96.
Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 263 (citing the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)).
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In addition to those statutes, the EPA and BLM may
control more aspects of the fracking process in the near future.97
In 2011, “the EPA announced plans . . . to initiate a rulemaking
under the Toxic Substances Control Act98 regarding disclosure of
chemicals used in the drilling process.”99 The BLM has drafted an
initial set of rules solely for fracking on public land, but a final
set of rules has not been issued.100
Several agencies provide additional oversight of fracking
activity.101 The EPA has previously conducted and continues to
conduct studies of water quality issues related to fracking. 102
These studies are likely in response to the primary issue
opponents of fracking cite when discussing the process’s alleged
negative consequences. The BLM also issues permits for drilling
on federal land and has designed a plan for “a new automated
system designed to track permit applications through the entire
review process and quickly flag missing or incomplete
information, permitting time delays are expected to be greatly
reduced.”103
The DOE oversees the fracking industry because it
controls the approval of natural gas exportation.104 The DOE
determines if domestically produced natural gas should be
exported overseas.105 “[P]olicymakers are concerned about the
long-term effects of natural gas exports on domestic supplies and
price,” so the DOE is hesitant to allow exportation.106
The DOE allows exportation across the board “to countries
with
which
the
U.S.
has
a
Free
Trade
97.
98.

See id. at 263–64 (explaining proposed regulations).
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–92

(2012).
99.
Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 263 (citing Letter
from Stephen A. Owens, Assistant Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, to Deborah Goldberg, Earthjustice (Nov. 23, 2011) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT)).
100.
See id. at 264 (outlining a possible addition to the regulatory
regime, but specifying the addition has not been finalized).
101.
See id. at 264–74 (describing that there is vast federal
oversight).
102.
See id. at 264–65 (noting studies currently being conducted to
determine fracking’s safety).
103.
Id. at 269.
104.
See id. at 271 (describing the DOE’s indirect regulatory power).
105.
See id. (explaining the DOE’s natural gas job).
106.
Id.
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Agreement (“FTA”) . . . [because those actions are] ‘consistent
with the public interest,’” but the DOE requires a case-by-case
determination on whether exportation to a non-FTA country is
consistent with the public interest. 107 “That public-interest
determination can involve a number of factors including the
short- and long-term effects on U.S. energy markets, supplies,
and price.”108

3. State Regulation
There are many more federal regulations and federal
agencies that have a role in the regulatory process, but “as with
oil and gas drilling overall, hydraulic fracturing regulation is
inherently local” because states regulate the key aspects of the
process and impose additional rules. 109
States have broad powers to regulate, permit and
enforce the drilling and fracture of the well,
production and operations, management and
disposal of wastes, and abandonment and plugging
of the well, . . . [and] [s]tate laws generally give an
agency or director of state oil and gas operations
discretion to require whatever is necessary to
protect human health and the environment.110
Pennsylvania’s oil and gas regulations specifically mention
fracking and restrictions imposed on it, which is atypical.
Pennsylvania even has regulations specifically addressing
fracking the Marcellus Shale.111 The Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (“PaDEP”) oversees all applications to
conduct hydraulic fracturing operations in Pennsylvania.112 The

107.
Id.
108.
Id. at 272.
109.
Id. at 260.
110.
Dennis, supra note 62, at 269.
111.
See generally, 25 PA. CODE § 78.1 (2014) (defining several terms
relate to fracking including “Marcellus Shale well”); 25 PA. CODE § 78.121
(outlining reporting requirements for Marcellus Shale wells).
112.
See 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3211 (2012) (listing the
requirements to obtain well permits, which are issued by “the department”); 58
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applications to PaDEP require information about the proposed
site and the surrounding land, including “the proposed location of
the well and ‘the name of all surface landowners or water
purveyors whose water supplies are within 1,000 feet of the
proposed well location,’” to protect the state’s citizens and
surrounding environment from any potential harm.113
If fracking taints a water supply, PaDEP will assume the
well operator liable if the well is within 1,000 feet of a water
supply and “the pollution occurred six months after completion of
drilling or alteration” to the well.114 Pennsylvania also requires
each well operator list the chemicals in its fracking fluid, the
wastes generated from the process, and the methods for cleanup,
disposal, and waste management.115 Like the studies conducted
by the EPA, the required disclosures and presumptions are likely
a direct answer to concerns fracking opponents have about water
quality in fracking areas.116
Colorado has more stringent regulations than the federal
government in an attempt to protect its water resources. 117
Colorado created an agency called the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission (“COGCC”) in the 1970s through
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act whose purpose is to
regulate oil and gas development.118 The COGCC regulations
require: establishing protection zones around streams that
provide drinking water supplies; reporting the chemicals used in
any fracking operations; consultation with state and wildlife
officials on fracking applications; and cleaning up of a well site
after fracking is completed.119 Colorado restricts oil and gas
development near homes and schools because of concern over the
PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (2012) (defining “Department” as “The
Department of Environmental Protection of the Commonwealth”).
113.
58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3211(b)(1) (2012).
114.
See 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3218 (outlining ways in which
Pennsylvania’s water supplies will be protected from fracking).
115.
See 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1 (2012) (listing the
disclosure requirements for unconventional hydraulic fracturing); 25 PA. CODE §
78.55 (2014) (requiring a waste management plan).
116.
Id.
117.
See Dennis, supra note 62, at 267 (describing Colorado’s state
regulations).
118.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-100 (creating the COGCC).
119.
See Colo. Code Regs. § 404-1 (creating regulations under the
COGCC)
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health of children.120 Finally, “[a]ll [oil and gas] development
proposals require landowner notification and public comment
periods.”121
New York issued a temporary moratorium on fracking in
August of 2010, pending the outcome of a groundwater
contamination study by the New York Department of
Environmental Conservation (“NYDEC”),122 but the moratorium
will continue as New York’s Assembly recently approved a twoyear ban on the process.123 If the moratorium is lifted at some
point in the future, New York already has regulations dealing
with the energy industry’s water use.124
While not a complete description of every state’s
regulatory regime, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and New York’s
regulations provide a wide array of state fracking regulations.
Most states have some form of fracking regulation, and many try
to provide a comprehensive set of rules to reduce the alleged
dangers for its citizens and landscape.125 Those states that do not
have regulatory rules specifically addressing fracking, like New
York, are studying the impacts of the process before allowing the
industry to move forward.126

4. Municipal Regulation

120.
See id., § 404-1:604 (restricting development near “high
occupancy buildings,” defined as homes and schools, among others.”
121.
Dennis, supra note 62, at 267.
122.
See Mireya Navarro, N.Y. Assembly Approves Fracking
Moratorium,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
30,
2010),

http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/n-y-assembly-approves-frackingmoratorium/ (stating the issuance of the temporary moratorium) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
123.
See Freeman Klopott, New York Assembly Approves Two-Year
Moratorium
on
Fracking,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
6,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/new-york-assembly-approves-twoyear-moratorium-on-fracking.html (noting New York’s continuing fight with
fracking) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
124.
See Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 9, at 280 (listing New
York’s potential fracking regulations).
125.
See id. (describing state regulations overall).
126.
See id. at 281–82 (explaining why some state’s do not have
regulations).
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In response to the possibility of having oil derricks placed
in small towns, local municipalities across the U.S. have begun to
ban fracking on the municipal level because of its potential
negative consequences.127 Towns along the Marcellus Shale
formation have been the most vehement in their anti-fracking
campaigns. Morgantown, West Virginia; Dryden, New York;
Robinson, Pennsylvania; and Munroe Falls, Ohio have each
enacted bans against fracking or zoning ordinances severely
restricting fracking. 128 Some cities not on the Marcellus Shale
have also enacted fracking limitations.129 For example,
Longmont, Colorado banned fracking altogether.130 Each city
believes it can enact these bans because they have legal authority
to care for its citizens’ and environment’s health and wellbeing.131
Limitations set by municipalities often conflict with state
laws, so legal preemption issues tend to dominate state courts. 132
State regulators and energy companies assert towns, like the
ones listed above, cannot create moratoriums on fracking because
the states issuing fracking permits have oil and gas development
laws already in place. 133 Thus, it is argued that any municipal
fracking law would be preempted.134 Some municipalities
disagree with that argument because states grant municipalities
police power and the power to create zoning laws specifically
tailored to protect their citizenry and environment.135
127.
See id. at 284 (outlining municipal responses to state fracking
permitting).
128.
See Goho, supra note 19 (listing specific towns embroiled in
litigation over their local fracking restrictions).
129.
See id. (explaining towns across the country restrict fracking).
130.
See Shippen Howe, Of Counsel, Van Ness Feldman LLP,
Speaker at the Energy Bar Association Conference: Round II - Legal and
Regulatory Issues Associated with Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil and Gas Shale
Formations (Oct. 2, 2013), PowerPoint Slide 53 (listing a specific town in
Colorado that banned fracking) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
131.
See Goho, supra note 19 (describing the basic argument towns
make in support of their local ordinances).
132.
See id. (noting litigation because of the differing laws).
133.
See id. (stating the state’s basic argument against municipal
restrictions).
134.
See id. (explaining the result states and energy companies
hope for).
135.
See id. (listing the municipalities’ basic argument).
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III. Analysis and Discussion
A. Preemption Litigation Overview
Three states, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York,
have completed their legal preemption litigation, and two states,
Ohio, and Colorado, have preemption litigation currently pending
in their state courts.136 Although the basic arguments are the
same in every case, it is important to understand the varying
facts of each case. The facts include how each party became
involved in the litigation and the exact language of each state’s
and each municipality’s fracking legislation. The language of the
regulations in each state sparking the preemption litigation
varies greatly, and the language is key because the
comprehensiveness of each state’s and each municipality’s laws
may determine the outcome of the pending cases.

B. Completed Preemption Cases
1. West Virginia
Overview
West Virginia is one of three states to have completed its
preemption litigation.137 In Northeast Natural Energy, LLC v. The
City of Morgantown, the Circuit Court of West Virginia, Division
No. 1, Monongalia County, analyzed whether West Virginia’s oil
and gas exploration laws,138 as promulgated by West Virginia’s
Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”), preempted
a municipal ordinance completely banning fracking139 in

136.
137.

See id. (outlining the states involved in preemption litigation).
See id. (describing the facts of West Virginia’s legal preemption

case).
138.
See W.VA. CODE § 22-1-1, 6 (2014).
139.
MORGANTOWN, W.VA., ORDINANCE 721.01-.03, available at
http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Frack_Actions_MorgantownWVban.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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Morgantown.140 The court held that West Virginia’s state law
preempted Morgantown’s fracking ban.141

Facts and Arguments
In 2011, Northeast Natural Energy, LLC (“Northeast”)
entered into a lease agreement for an industrial park just outside
the corporate limits of Morgantown, West Virginia, and the lease
agreement gave Northeast the right to drill, develop, and extract
natural gas under the property.142 Subsequently, WVDEP issued
permits to Northeast allowing it to drill on the site. 143 After the
permit issuance, the City of Morgantown enacted its ban on
fracking.144 Because of the ordinance, Northeast would have been
unable to drill. Northeast challenged the ban hoping to preclude
its enforcement. 145 Northeast contended that WVDEP’s oil and
gas exploration laws, which were enacted years before
Morgantown’s
ban,
preempted
Morgantown’s
fracking
ordinance.146
West Virginia’s oil and gas laws declare that “[t]he state
has the primary responsibility for protecting the environment;
other governmental entities, public and private organizations and
our citizens have the primary responsibility of supporting the
state in its role as protector of the environment.”147 The laws also
state that the purpose of the WVDEP is to “consolidate
environmental regulatory programs in a single state agency, while
also providing a comprehensive program for the conservation,
protection, exploration, development, enjoyment and use of the
natural resources of the state of West Virginia.”148 Lastly, the
laws declare that the state shall “[p]erform all duties as the
140.
See Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5–9 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (explaining the
details behind West Virginia’s preemption litigation).
141.
See id. at *10 (noting the holding in the case).
142.
See id. at *1 (describing Northeast’s interest in the litigation).
143.
See id. at *3 (elaborating on Northeast’s permitting process).
144.
See id. (explaining Morgantown’s response to the permit issued
to Northeast).
145.
See id. at *1 (noting the initial legal action taken by
Northeast).
146.
See id. (outlining Northeast’s basic argument).
147.
W. VA. CODE § 22-1-1 (2014) (emphasis added).
148.
Id.
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permit issuing authority . . . in all matters pertaining to the
exploration, development, production, storage and recovery of
this state's oil and gas.”149 Northeast asserted that the State
controlled fracking regulation because the State had a
comprehensive regulatory scheme in place.150 Thus, no local
ordinances contravening the state fracking law, like
Morgantown’s, were permitted.151
Morgantown completely banned fracking within the city
limits and within one mile of the corporate city limits. 152 The
city’s ordinance states:
It is hereby found that the drilling for oil and gas is
an activity which adversely impacts the
environment, interferes with the rights of the
citizens in the enjoyment of their property, and has
the potential for adversely affecting the health, well
being and safety of persons living and working in
and around areas where drilling operations exist.153
The ordinance also specifically refers to fracking as a process
with:
[A]n increased level of potential harm which
includes, but may not be limited to, contamination
of ground water and hazards associated with the
storage, treatment and transportation of the water
or other liquids after being used in the
process . . . [that] may impact the citizens, drinking
water, and property within the City of
Morgantown.154
Morgantown contended that it had the right to enact the ban
because there was a “Home Rule for Municipalities” within the
149.
Id. § 22-6-2 (2014) (emphasis added).
150.
See Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *7 (describing
why Northeast believes it should prevail).
151.
See id. (explaining Northeast’s desired result).
152.
See MORGANTOWN, W. VA., ORDINANCE 721.01-.03 (noting the
purpose of Morgantown’s ordinance).
153.
Id. at .01(emphasis added).
154.
Id. (emphasis added).
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West Virginia Constitution.155 Morgantown asserted that the
“Home Rule” gave the city the right to self-governance in
municipal matters including regulating nuisances for the
protection of its citizens, and the city likened fracking to a
nuisance because it could disturb the city’s citizens.156

Outcome
The Court agreed with Northeast and declared the
Morgantown fracking ban invalid.157 The ban was invalid because
the state already had comprehensive oil and gas exploration
regulations, so any local fracking regulation was preempted. 158
Under West Virginia law, an appeal must be filed within four
months of a court’s holding.159 Morgantown did not appeal within
that time frame.160 This case finalized West Virginia’s fracking
preemption litigation, and no more fracking preemption litigation
has arisen since the ruling.

2. Pennsylvania
Overview
Pennsylvania has also completed its fracking preemption
litigation.161 In Robinson Township, Washington County v.
Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed

155.
See Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *2 (stating what
Morgantown argues is the basis for its authority to enact and enforce the
ordinance); see also W.VA. CODE § 8-12-2 (1969) (granting “Home rule power for
all cities”).
156.
See Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *2 (noting
Morgantown’s specific reasoning underlying its argument).
157.
See id. at *10 (describing the outcome in West Virginia’s
preemption litigation).
158.
See id. (identifying the West Virginia court’s reasoning).
159.
See W. VA. CODE § 58-5-4 (2014) (describing the amount of time
allotted to file an appeal of a circuit court decision).
160
See Goho, supra note 19, at 4 (addressing the fact that West
Virginia did not appeal the Court’s decision).
161.
See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 915 (2013)
(listing Pennsylvania as a state with fracking preemption litigation).
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whether an amendment to the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act 162
violated the authority granted to Pennsylvanian municipalities to
protect the well-being of their citizens163 in the Pennsylvania
Constitution.164 This is the rare case where a town did not enact
an ordinance before litigating the issue. The Court held that the
amendment to Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act violated the
state’s constitution and cities may impose municipal fracking
restrictions.165

Facts and Arguments
In February 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature added
provisions to the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act.166 These
revisions included restricting prohibitive local oil and gas
regulations and required uniformity among local oil and gas
zoning ordinances.167 Pennsylvania’s amended Oil and Gas Act
stated, “[e]nvironmental acts are of Statewide concern and, to the
extent that they regulate oil and gas operations, occupy the entire
field of regulation, to the exclusion of all local ordinances.”168
In the following month, the citizens of Robinson sued
requesting a declaration that the revisions to the Oil and Gas Act
were unconstitutional because they wanted the ability to regulate
fracking in the future.169 Robinson’s citizens contended that the
revisions violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, specifically the
“Environmental Rights Amendment.”170 The “Environmental
Rights Amendment,” enacted in 1971, states:
162.
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3303 (2014) (granting exclusive regulation
of oil and gas industry to the state).
163.
PA. CONST. Art. 1., § 27 (2014) (outlining that natural resources
belong to the people of the state).
164.
See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913 (describing the litigation’s
players in detail).
165.
See id. at 977 (describing Pennsylvania’s preemption litigation
result).
166.
See id. at 901 (describing the initial step that led to the
litigation).
167.
See id. at 903 (elaborating on what specific state law additions
led to the litigation).
168.
58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303 (2014).
169.
See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 903 (2013) (explaining
Robinson’s legal action against the state).
170.
See id. (listing Robinson’s basic argument).
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[t]he people have a right to clean air, pure water,
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic,
historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.171
Robinson asserted that the state cannot “remove necessary and
reasonable authority from local governments to carry out these
constitutional duties” through legislation like the 2012
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act amendment.172 Robinson
contended that the revisions “denie[d] municipalities the ability
to carry out their constitutional obligation to protect public
natural resources”173 under the Environmental Rights
Amendment because they would not have the ability to regulate
an industry that extracted public natural resources. 174 Robinson
declared that the constitutional command for municipalities to
protect the environment limited the state’s police power.175
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania contended that the
amended Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act preempted any municipal
zoning ordinances enacted “to plan for environmental concerns
for oil and gas operations” because the Oil and Gas Act
“occup[ied] the entire field of regulation [(referring to oil and gas
exploration)] to the exclusion of all local ordinances.”176

Outcome

171.
PA. CONST. Art. 1., § 27 (2014).
172.
See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 901 (outlining Robinson’s
argument that the Pennsylvania constitution cannot be preempted by state
statutes).
173
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 470 (2013).
174.
See id. (outlining arguments that the regulation interferes
with the police powers granted under the Pennsylvania Constitution).
175.
See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (describing Robinson’s
general constitutional point).
176.
Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 470.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sided with Robinson
and ruled that the amended Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act
violated Pennsylvania’s Constitution.177 Pennsylvania’s Supreme
Court declared that the state’s police power could not disrupt a
municipal regulation if the local law involves the fundamental
power of respecting the city’s environment granted to
municipalities in the state’s constitution.178 Pennsylvania’s
Supreme Court’s handing down of this ruling completed
Pennsylvania’s fracking preemption litigation.179 Following the
ruling, Jordan Yeager, the attorney representing Robinson
Township, lauded the decision and said, “[c]ommunities can now
move forward to protect their residents” by enacting fracking
bans and not having to worry about preemption litigation.180

3. New York
Overview
New York completed its fracking preemption litigation in
Summer 2014.181 The Court of Appeals analyzed whether the
state’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law182 preempts a town
zoning ordinance in Dryden banning all activities related to
exploration, production, and storage of natural gas and
petroleum.183

177.
See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977 (describing Pennsylvania’s
preemption litigation result).
178.
See id. at 957 (outlining the Pennsylvania court’s reasoning).
179.
See id. (laying out the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion
on the Pennsylvania statute).
180.
Kelly Knaub, Pa. Justices Won’t Reconsider Landmark
Fracking
Decision,
LAW
360
(Feb.
21,
2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/512396/pa-justices-won-t-reconsider-landmarkfracking-decision (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
181.
See Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1191 (N.Y.
2014) (noting New York’s settled preemption litigation) .
182.
N.Y. ENERGY LAW §§ 23-0303[2]; 23-0101[20][c]; 23-0503[2]
(McKinney 2013) (stating that it is in the public interest to regulate oil and gas).
183.
See Norse Energy Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714,
716 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (outlining the basic arguments in New York’s
preemption litigation).
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Facts and Arguments
In August 2011, the Town of Dryden in New York enacted
a zoning ordinance that “ban[ned] all activities related to the
exploration for, and the production or storage of, natural gas and
petroleum” including fracking within the town.184 Soon thereafter
Anschutz Exploration Corporation (“Anschutz”), a driller and
developer of oil and natural gas wells with preexisting leases for
land in Dryden, filed suit and sought a declaratory judgment that
would invalidate the town’s ordinance.185 Anschutz lost at the
lowest court level and then appealed to an intermediate appellate
court.186 Anschutz also lost at the intermediate appellate level
and immediately appealed to New York’s highest court.
Anschutz asserted that New York’s Oil, Gas, and Solution
Mining Law (“OGSML”), enacted in the 1980’s, preempted
Dryden’s recent zoning ordinance.187 New York’s OGSML declares
that state law “shall supersede all local laws or ordinances
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining
industries.”188 New York’s OGSML also concerns the details and
procedures of well spacing by drilling operators stating “[t]he
[D]epartment [of Environmental Conservation] shall issue a
permit
to
drill . . . if
the
proposed
spacing
unit
submitted . . . conforms to statewide spacing and is of
approximately uniform shape.”189
Anschutz contended that the zoning ordinance was
expressly preempted or, in the alternative, impliedly
preempted.190 Anschutz believed expressed preemption applied
because “the plain language of this provision prohibits
municipalities from enacting laws or ordinances ‘relating to the
184.
Id. at 716–18.
185.
See id. at 716 (outlining the initial fact that led to the
preemption litigation).
186.
See Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1193 (explaining the procedural
history of the case).
187.
See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S. 2d at 716 (noting the energy
company’s basic argument).
188.
N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 23-0303[2] (McKinney 2013) (emphasis
added).
189.
Id. §§ 23-0101[20][c]; 23-0503[2] (emphasis added).
190.
See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718–23 (N.Y. App. Div.
2013) (listing the energy company’s specific arguments).
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regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries.’” 191
Anschutz also believed implied preemption applied because “a
‘local government . . . may not exercise its police power by
adopting a local law inconsistent with constitutional or general
law,’” and both the state law and the municipal law address and
conflict on where drilling is to occur. 192
Dryden contended that each town has “home rule powers,”
granted to it through New York’s Municipal Home Rule Law,193
which include the right to regulate land use through zoning
ordinances in order to protect the environment.194 Dryden further
asserted that its zoning ordinance did not “seek to regulate the
details or procedure of the oil, gas and solution mining industries.
Rather, it simply establishes permissible and prohibited uses of
land within the Town for the purpose of regulating land
generally.”195
In its zoning ordinance, Dryden proclaimed that “[n]o land
in the Town shall be used: to conduct any exploration for natural
gas and/or petroleum; [or] to drill any well for natural gas and/or
petroleum.”196 The zoning ordinance lists various potential
dangers associated with natural gas exploration as its reasons for
restricting exploration.197 Potential dangers to “the health, safety
and general welfare of the community” including “deposit of
toxins into the air, soil, water, environment, and in the bodies of
residents.”198 The town clarified as well that:
the Zoning Ordinance is not directed at the
regulatory scheme for the operation of natural gas
wells under ECL Article 23, it addresses land use
191.
Id. at 719.
192.
Id. at 723.
193.
See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(11) (McKinney
2011) (describing the home rules powers granted to towns in New York).
194.
See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (explaining that
“Among the powers delegated to local governments is the authority to regulate
the use of land through the enactment of zoning laws.”).
195.
Id. at 719.
196.
See
Dryden
Ordinance,
available
at
http://dryden.ny.us/Downloads/PROPOSED_AMENDMENTS_ZONING_ORDIN
ANCE.pdf (explaining prohibited uses for land in Dryden) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
197.
See id. (describing the reasoning behind Dryden’s local ban).
198.
Id.
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and nuisance concerns and the protection of the
health, safety and general welfare of the people of
the Town of Dryden and the enhancement of its
physical environment.199

Thus, the town believed that while the ordinance may have an
incidental effect on the fracking industry, New York’s OGSML
did not preempt this zoning ordinance.200 Dryden also rebutted
Anschutz’s implied preemption argument by explaining that the
state law focused on the details and procedures of drilling while
the municipal law addressed traditional land use zoning
considerations.201 Thus, the two laws “do not conflict, but rather,
may harmoniously coexist.”202

Outcome
New York’s highest court agreed with Dryden.203 The court
acknowledged in its opinion that this case involved “major policy
questions for the coordinate branches of government to resolve[,
but] the discrete issue before us . . . is whether the state
legislature eliminated the home rule capacity of municipalities to
pass zoning laws that exclude oil, gas and hydrofracking
activities in order to preserve the existing character of their
communities.”204
The Court ruled that a reading of the plain language,
legislative history, and the purpose and policy of New York’s
OGSML did not lead the court to conclude that Dryden’s
ordinance was expressly or impliedly preempted. 205 “[I]n light of
ECL 23–0303(2)'s plain language, its place within the OGSML's
framework and the legislative background, we cannot say that
199.
Id. (emphasis added).
200.
See Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (explaining the city’s
reasoning).
201.
See id. at 723 (presenting the city’s reasoning to the energy
company’s alternative theory).
202.
Id.
203.
See Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1203 (N.Y.
2014) (noting the New York Court of Appeals holding).
204.
Id.
205.
See id. at 1196–1203 (explaining the reasoning behind the New
York court’s holding).
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the supersession clause—added long before the current debate
over high-volume hydrofracking and horizontal drilling ignited—
evinces a clear expression of preemptive intent.”206 More than 170
towns in New York have passed bans or moratoria on fracking
similar to Dryden’s ban, and those towns can now rest easy
because New York’s highest court cemented their local
regulations.207
C. Current Preemption Litigation

1. Ohio
Overview
Ohio has not completed its fracking preemption litigation,
but the state’s highest court heard oral arguments over the issue
in early 2014.208 The Ohio Supreme Court will determine if Ohio’s
state law granting Ohio’s Department of Natural Resources sole
regulation of gas and oil operations within the state 209 preempts
Munroe Falls’ drilling ordinance.210

Facts and Arguments
In February 2011, Ohio’s Department of Natural
Resources issued drilling permits to Beck Energy Corporation
allowing the company to frack on property in Munroe Falls,
Ohio.211 Soon after drilling began, the city sought an injunction to
stop Beck Energy from drilling.212 “The city claimed Beck Energy
206.
Id. at 1203.
207.
See id. stating that the ban “encourages the increasing number
of communities across the country opting to place limits on the controversial
practice.”).
208.
See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 135 Ohio
St.3d at 1469 (Ohio 2013) (noting the unresolved nature of Ohio’s fracking
preemption litigation).
209.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013) (explaining rules
for the statewide regulation of oil and gas activities).
210.
See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d
85, 97 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (elaborating on the issue in the case).
211.
See id. at 88 (describing the background leading to the case).
212.
See id. (noting the first legal step taken).

326

6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014)

did not comply with its [local] ordinance requiring permits for
drilling,” and a trial court granted the injunction.213 Beck Energy
appealed the decision quickly to an intermediate appeals court,
the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Summit County.214
Beck Energy contended that the city’s ordinance, enacted
in 1980, directly conflicted with Ohio’s state oil and gas law,
enacted in 1965.215 The state oil and gas law creates “in the
department of natural resources the division of oil and gas
resources management,”216 and declares that the division of oil
and gas resources management has “sole and exclusive authority
to regulate the permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas
wells and production operations within the state, excepting only
those activities regulated under federal laws for which oversight
has been delegated to the environmental protection agency.” 217
The law further explains that:
[t]he regulation of oil and gas activities is a matter
of general statewide interest that requires uniform
statewide regulation, and this chapter and rules
adopted under it constitute a comprehensive plan
with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling,
well stimulation, completing, and operating of oil
and gas wells within this state . . . .218
The statute clarifies that “[n]othing in this section affects the
authority granted to . . . local authorities . . . provided that the
authority granted under those sections shall not be exercised in a
manner that discriminates against, unfairly impedes, or obstructs
oil and gas activities and operations regulated under this
chapter.”219 Under the state law, the state has the sole and
exclusive authority to regulate gas production operations within
Ohio, and Beck Energy asserted that the existing city ordinances

213.
214.
215.
argument).
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
See id. (noting Beck Energy’s legal response).
See id. at 91 (outlining generally the energy company’s
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013)
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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also attempted to regulate gas production operations.220 Thus, the
state law preempted the city’s ordinance, and Beck Energy
argued that it should be allowed to continue drilling.221
Munroe Falls, on the other hand, contended that the local
ordinance was valid because “local municipalities have home-rule
authority, under Section 3, Article XVIII of [the] Ohio
Constitution, to regulate gas drilling operations.”222 Ohio’s
Constitution states “[m]unicipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” 223
Munroe Falls’ drilling ordinance states that “[n]o . . . entity shall
commence to drill a well for oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons within
the corporate limits of the Municipality until such time as such
persons have wholly complied with all provisions of this chapter
and a conditional zoning certificate” issued by the city.224 The
ordinance also requires that a public hearing be held for town
citizens to voice their concerns and “the hearing . . . shall be
mandatory . . . precedent to the commencement of drilling . . . .”225

Outcome
The Court of Appeals of Ohio agreed with Beck and
declared Munroe Falls’ drilling ordinance invalid on preemption
grounds because the state regulation’s wording gave the state
sole oil and gas regulatory power.226 Munroe Falls then appealed
the court’s ruling, and the Ohio Supreme Court granted appeal
and heard oral arguments on February 26, 2014.227 A ruling is
expected by Spring 2015.
220.
See State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 91 (explaining the
energy company’s reasoning).
221.
See id. (listing the energy company’s desired outcome).
222.
Id. at 92.
223.
OH. CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3.
224.
MUNROE FALLS, OH., ORDINANCE § 1329.03 (2012) (emphasis
added).
225.
Id. (emphasis added).
226.
See State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–99 (explaining the
outcome in Ohio’s preemption litigation).
227.
See Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio Justices Hear Local Drilling Rules
Dispute,
THE
WASHINGTON
TIMES
(Feb.
26,
2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/26/ohio-justices-to-hear-local-
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2. Colorado
Overview
Colorado also has not finalized its fracking preemption
litigation yet.228 The Colorado Oil & Gas Association (“COGA”),
an oil and gas trade association, sought a declaratory judgment in
Colorado District Court invalidating a resolution,229 which has
the same legal power as an ordinance, enacted by the City of
Longmont that banned fracking within the city limits. 230 COGA
asserted that the state’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act231
preempted Longmont’s fracking ban.232

Facts and Arguments
In November 2012, Longmont, Colorado enacted a
resolution that prohibited fracking within the city limits. 233 With
the support of the state of Colorado, COGA filed suit seeking to
invalidate the city resolution. 234 The trade association filed suit
on behalf of the state and many drillers with lease interests in
Longmont.235

drilling-rules-dispute/?page=all (discussing the status of Morrison) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
228.
See Complaint at 1, Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n v. City of
Longmont,
Colo.,
available
at
http://ourlongmont.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/20121218_010338_COGAfiling.pdf (outlining the lack
of finality in Colorado’s preemption litigation).
229.
Longmont, Co. Resolution R-2012-67 (2012), available at
http://www.co.weld.co.us/assets/dD0d5d4aa3487776BC8D.pdf.
230.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63,
2014 WL 3690665, at *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. July 24, 2014)
(explaining what the Colorado Oil and Gas Association wanted).
231.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(a) (2013) (explaining the
powers allocated to the commission).
232.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at 1 (outlining
the Colorado Oil and Gas Association’s basic preemption argument).
233.
See id. (noting the background leading to Colorado’s fracking
preemption litigation)
234.
See id. (describing the first legal action taken).
235.
See id. at 2 (explaining the plaintiff’s interest in the case).
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COGA claimed that the city’s resolution directly opposed
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, which was enacted
decades before Longmont’s resolution, “because it prohibits oil
and gas activity that the state permits.”236 Longmont’s Resolution
“prohibit[ed] within the city of Longmont the use of hydraulic
fracturing to extract oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons, and
prohibit[ed] . . . the storage in open pits or disposal of solid or
liquid wastes created in connection with the hydraulic fracturing
process.”237
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act created the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and vested it
with the “authority to regulate [t]he drilling, producing,
and . . . all other operations for the production of oil and gas.” 238
The purpose of the Commission regulating oil and gas operations
is “to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental
impacts on any air, water, soil, or biological resource resulting
from oil and gas operations to the extent necessary to protect
public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the
environment and wildlife resources.”239
COGA asserted that this was an irreconcilable operational
conflict that should result in the invalidation of the city
resolution.240 In the alternative, COGA asserted that the local
law “materially impede[d] or destroy[ed] . . . [the] state[‘s]
interest” underlying Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act
because the local law prohibited fracking while the state
permitted it.241
Longmont did not contest COGA’s “authority to regulate
hydraulic fracturing . . . [or] that the Commission is charged with
fostering production ‘in a manner consistent with protection of
public health, safety and welfare, including protection of the
environment and wildlife resources.’” 242 Instead, Longmont

236.
237.
238.

Id. at 9.
LONGMONT, CO., ORDINANCE art. XVI, § 16.3 (2012).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-106(2)(a) (West 2013) (emphasis

added).
239.
Id. § 34-60-106(2)(d) (emphasis added).
240.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *9 (listing
Colorado’s general argument).
241.
Id at *8.
242
Id. at *11.
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complained that COGA was “not doing its job to Longmont’s
satisfaction.”243

Outcome
Judge Mallard of Boulder County District Court agreed
with COGA and concluded that “[t]here is no way to harmonize
Longmont's fracking ban with the stated goals of the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act, . . . [and] the conflict in this case is an
irreconcilable conflict.” 244 Thus, the court granted COGA’s initial
motion for summary judgment, but the court also stayed the
order while Longmont considers an appeal, which is likely. 245

D. State and Energy Companies’ Interests and Arguments
Are the Same
The energy companies and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in the preemption cases listed above seek the same
result. They do not want any municipal restrictions on fracking
that exceed state limitations.246 The energy companies and
Pennsylvania do not want any local fracking regulations that
conflict with each state’s existing oil and gas regulatory regime.247
Pennsylvania and the energy companies want to minimize
local restrictions because more regulation typically makes it
harder to reap the benefits of fracking. A complete ban on
fracking would limit natural gas and oil production, limit job
growth related to fracking, limit reductions in home gas

243.
Id.
244.
Id. at *13.
245.
See id. (explaining the ruling and potential future litigation).
246.
See id. at *8–9; Norse Energy Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 964
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy
Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 97–100 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); Robinson Twp. v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957; Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. The City of
Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5–6 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12,
2011) (noting the outcome against the municipalities is the same across the
cases).
247.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9; Norse
Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719; State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100;
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957; Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6
(describing the desires of the states and energy companies generally).
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expenses, and limit state tax revenue.248 Additional permitting
processes and more stringent requirements on the fracking
process at a municipal level could also discourage companies from
drilling within the municipality or state because those
restrictions likely make the whole process longer and more costly.
The basic argument that the energy companies and
Pennsylvania used is the same.249 Each contended that the oil
and gas regulations at the state level preempted the more
restrictive municipal laws.250 Each asserted that the municipal
regulations conflicted with the state laws, and thus, the
municipal laws should be invalidated.251 How the local laws
conflicted with the state regulations varied based on the wording
and legislative history of each states’ and municipalities’ laws,
but generally the conflict boiled down to Pennsylvania and the
energy companies believing that the wording and the history of
their respective state statutes created a comprehensive
248.
See Section II.B.2 (discussing the positive consequences of
fracking).
249.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the
locality could not enforce its regulations because the state’s regulations took
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was
the one who held authority to do so).
250.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the
locality could not enforce its regulations because the state’s regulations took
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was
the one who held authority to do so).
251.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the
locality could not enforce its regulations because the state’s regulations took
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was
the one who held authority to do so).
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regulatory system or granted the state sole regulatory authority
and thus every state law preempted any municipal regulatory
attempt.252

E. Municipalities’ Interests and Arguments Are the Same
The municipalities involved in the preemption cases listed
above all seek the same result, which is to have their local
fracking restrictions remain valid.253 Most of the municipalities
desire outright fracking bans, and one advocated for a lengthier
pre-drilling registration process. 254 The municipalities try to
impose these restrictions because of alleged potential negative
consequences associated with fracking: chemical spills, chemical
fires, seismic activity, and groundwater contamination among
others.255
While none of those negative repercussions definitely will
occur, the municipalities would rather minimize the possibility of
injury to their environment and citizenry. In enacting these
restrictions, the municipalities appear to be invoking the
precautionary principle, an international environmental law
concept, because they, like countries around the world, “recognize

252.
See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (stating the argument is
that authority should be given to the governing state body, rather than the
municipality).
253.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing
that the municipality wishes to maintain their fracking regulations); Norse
Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the municipality already has
regulations in place); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (stating that,
despite the state’s regulations, the locality should be able to regulate as well);
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (noting the municipality’s desire to regulate
fracking as well); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 (contending
that the locality should be able to keep their fracking regulations in place).
254.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing
for an outright fracking ban); Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (arguing for an
outright fracking ban); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing for
a lengthier pre-drilling registration process); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957
(arguing for an outright fracking ban); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376,
at *5-6 (arguing for an outright fracking ban).
255.
See supra Part II.B.1 (listing the negative effects the
municipalities want to avoid).
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as a matter of . . . law that it is preferable to prevent pollution
than to deal with pollution after it has occurred.”256
All the municipalities utilized the same basic argument in
257
court. The municipalities contended that their respective state
statutes did not preempt their local ordinances.258 The
municipalities asserted that each was granted power by the state
to adopt ordinances concerning local issues, and fracking was an
issue of local concern. 259 Each supported its local concern theory
by arguing that the potential harms associated with fracking
would affect its citizenry and its environment, and thus, each city
or town should be able to use its power of self-governance to
restrict fracking in order to protect its environment and
residents.260

F. State and Energy Companies’ Argument Should Prevail
As seen above, state courts have split fairly evenly on the
preemption litigation thus far.261 West Virginia, Ohio, and
Colorado’s courts sided with the energy companies in their cases
and invalidated local fracking bans on preemption grounds. 262
Pennsylvania and New York’s courts sided with the

256.
James E. Hickey Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
423, 423 (1995).
257.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2014 WL 3690665, at *8–9 (arguing
that the Commission does not regulate hydraulic fracking); Norse Energy, 964
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (stating that the regulations were preempted by the state
regulations); State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97–100 (arguing that the
locality could not enforce it’s regulations because the state’s regulations took
precedence); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (discussing the illegality of a
possibly preempted statute); Ne. Natural Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6
(contending that the locality lacked authority to regulate because the state was
the one who held authority to do so).
258.
See Goho, supra note 19, at 3 (noting the localities’ basic
argument).
259.
See id. at 3 (elaborating on each municipality choosing to
argue that they were granted powers by state constitutions).
260.
See id. at 3–5 (discussing the specific power granted to the
municipalities by their state constitutions).
261.
See id. at 6 (concluding that states have mixed results on
fracking bans).
262.
See id. (showing which states invalidated local fracking bans).
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municipalities in their cases. 263 But the preemption litigation in
Ohio and Colorado is not yet completed because the Ohio case is
up on appeal and the recent Colorado district court ruling will
likely be appealed 264
The upcoming final phases of preemption litigation should
likely result in victories for the energy companies and state
governments rather than the municipalities. Although the state
and municipal legislatures each weigh the positive and negative
consequences when enacting laws, it is not the court’s job to take
those policy concerns under consideration. The courts should
focus on the constitutional preemption issue and conclude that
each state’s regulatory restrictions preempt the municipal
regulations.
Munroe Falls, Ohio and Dryden, New York both cited
their state-granted municipal home-rule powers as evidence they
should have the power to regulate fracking because fracking can
have an effect on the municipality.265 Longmont, Colorado will
likely make the same home-rule power argument as Munroe
Falls and Dryden, if the case moves to the appeals court level.
But the home-rule powers granted in Ohio declare
“[m]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of
local self-government . . . as are not in conflict with general
laws[,]” and “general laws” refers to state statutes.266 Ohio’s state
oil and gas regulation explicitly grants the state sole oil and gas
regulatory power.267 Thus, Munroe Falls’ municipal law conflicts
with the state statute and is impliedly preempted.268 Ohio’s
263.

See id. (discussing which states allowed municipal fracking

bans).
264.
See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 8–
9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. July 24, 2014); Norse Energy Corp. USA v.
Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); State ex rel.
Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 97–100 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013);
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957; Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v.
City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *5-6 (describing the
future litigation certain to occur).
265.
See Norse Energy Corp., 964 N.Y.S.2d at 723; State ex rel.
Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97 (explaining both cities preemption arguments).
266.
John Martinez, 1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4:7 (2013).
267.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013) (explaining the
division of oil and gas resources management).
268.
See id. § 4:13 (discussing how implied preemption differs from
express preemption).
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Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of its lower appeals
court and rule in favor of Beck.269
The stated goals of the Act and the ban are mutually
exclusive, and thus an irreconcilable conflict exists between the
state’s Act and Longmont’s ban.270 If Longmont appeals the
district court’s order, the appeals court should follow the
reasoning of Judge Mallard and affirm the order.

G. Increased Federal Regulation is the Answer
This Note has shown how convoluted the existing threeprong regulatory system is and how it causes significant issues
for the nation, the states, citizens, and businesses.271 While some
legal scholars propose increasing local government control, 272
most present plans that focus on increasing federal regulatory
power.273 Although the creation of a comprehensive federal
regulatory regime for fracking would likely be arduous, onerous,
and costly, many believe it is much needed.274
It would be near impossible to describe every federal
fracking regulation scheme put forward, but generally there are
two types of proposals: a fully federally regulated “one-size fits
all” model or an enhanced federal regulatory standard with some
minimal, yet necessary, state regulation “cooperative federalism”
model.275 The one-size fits all model has advantages including
269.
See State ex rel. Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 97 (outlining why
future Ohio litigation should follow Ohio precedent).
270.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-106(2)(a) (West 2013)
(listing the Colorado Oil and Gas Conversation Commission’s regulatory power).
271.
See Goho, supra note 19 (explaining the intricacy of the
existing fracking regulatory regime).
272.
See Rachel A. Kitze, Moving Past Preemption: Enhancing the
Power of Local Governments Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 385,
412–13 (2013) (noting a proposed regulatory scheme seeking to empower local
governments more so than the existing regulatory scheme).
273.
See Gerken, supra note 89, at 128 (describing a potential
regulatory scheme focused on the federal government setting the standards for
the fracking industry).
274.
See id. (explaining how a cooperative federal regulatory regime
is one possible answer to fracking’s existing regulatory issues).
275.
See Saby Ghoshray, Charting the Future Trajectory for
Fracking Regulation: From Environmental Democracy to Cooperative
Federalism, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 199, 233–37 (outlining the basic future
fracking regulatory models).
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having centralized governing bodies that would have sole
regulatory control, likely the EPA or the DOE, and being less
redundant and costly, which could arise from state and federal
bodies performing the same work in a cooperative regulatory
regime.276 But most legal scholars believe the disadvantages of
the one-size fits all model, including the lack of understanding
about each state’s local geography and economic situation,
outweigh the advantages.277
Most legal scholars champion the cooperative federalism
model because it enhances federal power while leaving the states
some individualized control. 278 The cooperative federalism model
would allow federal agencies to create comprehensive mandatory
standards for every aspect of the fracking process. 279 The
mandatory standards would serve as minimums for the states to
follow, but the states, because of their specific geographical,
economic, and societal nuances, could impose more stringent
regulations if they see fit.280

IV. Conclusion
All of the courts currently hearing fracking preemption
cases should rule that the respective state laws regulating oil and
gas exploration preempt the local fracking ban. The
municipalities that ban fracking cite their home-rule powers as
support for their local regulations, but all of the municipal homerule powers currently before the courts have a caveat that ruins
the cities’ arguments. The home-rule powers only allow municipal
laws that are not inconsistent with state law, and all of the local
regulations are inconsistent with their respective state laws.
Thus, if fracking grows in the future and occurs in states
without fracking regulations, future state fracking laws should be
276.
See id. at 237 (describing the advantages of a solely federally
regulated fracking industry).
277.
See id. (discussing disadvantages outweighing the potential
advantages of fracking).
278.
See id. (explaining the disadvantages of the one-size fits all
federal regulation plan).
279.
See id. (noting the increased comprehensive power of the
federal government).
280.
See id. (describing how a cooperative federalism regulatory
scheme would work in practice).
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clear and explain that the state has sole and exclusive authority
to regulate the industry and has a comprehensive regulatory
regime in place. Then, if a municipality fights back, bans
fracking, and litigation arises, the state should win the
preemption case because a municipality banning fracking clearly
contradicts a state law granting the state all regulatory power.
As seen through this Note, the existing regulatory regime
is convoluted, complex, and costly. Politicians have a chance to do
the right thing right now and end any future preemption
litigation before it begins by creating the new regulatory regime
that legal scholars call for.281 A regulatory scheme that would
enhance the federal government’s regulatory power, reduces the
states’ regulatory authority, and eliminates any local regulatory
authority.282 This mainly centralized regulatory system would
drastically reduce redundancy and costs and would eliminate
potential preemption litigation.

281.
See id. (noting the most frequently proposed and lauded
alternative regulatory system).
282.
See id. (explaining how much regulatory power each level of
government would have in this alternative regulatory regime).

